On 19 July, Serbia and the European Union signed a Memorandum establishing a strategic partnership on critical raw materials in the presence of the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The partnership revolves around Serbian reserves of lithium, a metal crucial for the production of batteries expected to power German electric cars. All sides emphasised economic benefits for Serbia, which wants to attract manufacturers of batteries and even electric vehicles to reap more benefits of lithium extraction.
The project, however, is highly controversial on two levels. Firstly, there is a concern that the mining would be detrimental to the environment of the Jadar region, where the reserves of lithium are located. While the mining company Rio Tinto, which is in charge of the project, the Serbian government and the EU continue to argue that the operation can be carried out in an environmentally safe way, the suspicions remain widespread, especially regarding the trust in Serbian institutions which are supposed to enforce these standards.
On the second level, the project is seen as yet another instance of the EU sacrificing its values in favour of strategic and economic interests. The state of Serbian democracy was criticised in the wake of the December 2023 elections by both the EU institutions and the German government, to the approval of pro-EU opposition. Now, the lithium deal is expected to trump any concerns over these issues, leaving this part of society disappointed.
There are no reasons to expect that the already shaky perception of the EU in Serbia will emerge improved from these developments. If there is a movement in public opinion, it will go in the opposite direction. The EU is facing yet another reputational challenge in Serbia, which will make the fulfilment of its official goal of getting the country to prepare for membership more complicated.
The enduring unpopularity of lithium
A clear sign of how unpopular lithium mining is came in the winter of 2021/2022 when massive protests forced the government to cancel its own decision establishing the conditions for the project. Ever since then, a large number of critics have been pointing out that the initiative was not over and that the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and President Aleksandar Vučić are only waiting for the right moment to bring it back.
They were proven right. Two and a half years later, after the ruling coalition secured victories in a series of national and local elections, the government re-opened the lithium issue. Following a sudden ruling of the Constitutional Court in July 2024, the 2022 government decision was annulled. This re-established the conditions for opening a mine, pending the issuing of further licenses. Only a week later, a Memorandum was signed with the EU in the presence of the German Chancellor.
Since the temporary cancellation of the project, Rio Tinto, which still has an exploration license in Serbia, stepped up its communication game, arguing to the Serbian public that the project would be economically beneficial and environmentally safe. The company was joined in these efforts last month by the government and President Vučić who, in one of his many addresses to the nation, said that the “sky is the limit” for Serbia should it succeed in attracting the lithium-powered electric vehicle value chain.
Despite these efforts, there are many signs that the project’s unpopularity remains high. For one thing, the entire opposition is against it. Opponents of the project, in addition to politicians, include activists and public figures of various ideological backgrounds, who criticize it from different angles. Some of them, mostly those on the liberal side, are focusing on the mistrust in the government and the institutions, while others, mostly those on the right, are channelling anti-Western and, as of this month, anti-German sentiments.
A new wave of protests against lithium mining started in late June. So far, citizens have taken to the streets of multiple cities and towns outside Belgrade, and further protests have been scheduled. They have not reached the size or visibility of 2021, but the coming months will probably be a better indicator of the readiness of people to mobilize.
A poll taken by the New Serbian Political Thought (NSPM) at the end of June and beginning of July found that, even with the environmental guarantees of Germany and the EU, 52,1% of the respondents would be against the opening of the mine, while 33,7% would support it. This pollster has not always been reliable, though this time the error would have to be major to make a difference.
Crossing the partisan divides
If only about a third of the population supports the opening of a lithium mine, that would imply that not even all of the supporters of the ruling coalition are on board, which was assumed to be the case when it was first cancelled in 2022. Dušan Milenković, a political consultant, also takes this view of the situation.
“Supporters aligned with the government, particularly those with clientelistic ties with SNS, will likely continue to endorse the regime’s policies, including the lithium project. However, there is a notable faction of pro-government voters who oppose this initiative. Opposition supporters are likely to react negatively as well. The general mistrust in the government’s motives, combined with doubts about their ability to manage such a project without corruption and to uphold the highest environmental standards, fuels this disapproval”, Milenković says for European Western Balkans.
In his remarks on the day of the signing of the Memorandum, President Vučić said that he expected the support for the project to gradually grow “when people see how diligent and committed we are and who our partners are”. He claimed that there was limited support for other government projects in the past and that it has increased over time.
Dušan Milenković, on the other hand, does not believe that the majority support for the project will be reached.
“While shifts in public opinion are possible, they are unlikely to be substantial enough to garner majority support for the lithium project. The dual concerns of regime integrity and their capability to preserve the environment are significant hurdles that cannot be easily overcome”, he says.
Consequences for the perception of the EU
The EU has frequently struggled with its popularity in Serbia compared to other parts of the Western Balkans. Many observers explain this with the anti-Western sentiments that took hold during the isolation of the country in the 1990s and escalated over the highly emotional issue of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. These sentiments are still regularly supported in Serbia not only by the Russian state media but also by the dominant tabloids and TV stations close to the government.
Despite this, support for EU membership was usually above 50% and the opposition below 30% for the first decade of the rule of SNS, according to the polls commissioned by the Ministry of European Integration.
Dušan Milenković points out that the strong push from major EU countries for the independence of Kosovo has always contained the issue of EU membership in Serbia, but that “the allure of the EU as a symbol of democracy and progress has traditionally maintained good levels of support among Serbian citizens”.
However, the support for EU membership dropped sharply following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the pressures on Serbia to join the sanctions imposed by the Union. In April 2022, Ipsos reported that the majority of citizens were against EU membership in Serbia. Most recent polls have shown that the support for membership is still slightly ahead of the opposition, but that it has remained below 50%.
Crossing the partisan divides
If only about a third of the population supports the opening of a lithium mine, that would imply that not even all of the supporters of the ruling coalition are on board, which was assumed to be the case when it was first cancelled in 2022. Dušan Milenković, a political consultant, also takes this view of the situation.
“Supporters aligned with the government, particularly those with clientelistic ties with SNS, will likely continue to endorse the regime’s policies, including the lithium project. However, there is a notable faction of pro-government voters who oppose this initiative. Opposition supporters are likely to react negatively as well. The general mistrust in the government’s motives, combined with doubts about their ability to manage such a project without corruption and to uphold the highest environmental standards, fuels this disapproval”, Milenković says for European Western Balkans.
In his remarks on the day of the signing of the Memorandum, President Vučić said that he expected the support for the project to gradually grow “when people see how diligent and committed we are and who our partners are”. He claimed that there was limited support for other government projects in the past and that it has increased over time.
Dušan Milenković, on the other hand, does not believe that the majority support for the project will be reached.
“While shifts in public opinion are possible, they are unlikely to be substantial enough to garner majority support for the lithium project. The dual concerns of regime integrity and their capability to preserve the environment are significant hurdles that cannot be easily overcome”, he says.
Consequences for the perception of the EU
The EU has frequently struggled with its popularity in Serbia compared to other parts of the Western Balkans. Many observers explain this with the anti-Western sentiments that took hold during the isolation of the country in the 1990s and escalated over the highly emotional issue of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. These sentiments are still regularly supported in Serbia not only by the Russian state media but also by the dominant tabloids and TV stations close to the government.
Despite this, support for EU membership was usually above 50% and the opposition below 30% for the first decade of the rule of SNS, according to the polls commissioned by the Ministry of European Integration.
Dušan Milenković points out that the strong push from major EU countries for the independence of Kosovo has always contained the issue of EU membership in Serbia, but that “the allure of the EU as a symbol of democracy and progress has traditionally maintained good levels of support among Serbian citizens”.
However, the support for EU membership dropped sharply following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the pressures on Serbia to join the sanctions imposed by the Union. In April 2022, Ipsos reported that the majority of citizens were against EU membership in Serbia. Most recent polls have shown that the support for membership is still slightly ahead of the opposition, but that it has remained below 50%.
The EU has since stepped up its efforts to improve its perception among Serbian citizens. Billboards promoting various forms of cooperation between the Union and Serbia have become frequent in Serbian cities. But just as the issue of sanctions on Russia somewhat receded in the background as diplomatic pressures eased, another perceptional challenge came for the EU – lithium.
Milenković believes that the recent endorsement of the lithium mining project represents a further strain on EU favorability in Serbia.
“This initiative is perceived by many as an assault on Serbia’s natural environment, escalating the existing grievances related to Kosovo and governmental autocracy to a new domain—direct impact on Serbian land, water, and biodiversity. This could potentially recast the EU not just as a partner, but as an adversary in the eyes of many Serbians”, he says.
Of course, the situation is complex, as the more nationalist and conservative part of the population has for a long time tended to regard the EU as more of an adversary. The problem for the Union, in this case, is that this move risks alienating many of those who have tended to see it as a partner too.
“A slap in the face” for pro-EU citizens
EU is facing a tricky tradeoff in Serbia, given the fact that it has a new interest in maintaining a good relationship with the government, while at the same time, a significant number of pro-EU citizens vote for the opposition. This was demonstrated, for example, by a poll carried out by the think tank Crta in 2022 which asked the respondents whether they would be glad or concerned were Serbia to become an EU member. A large majority of supporters of the opposition parties answered they would be glad and, conversely, a large majority of government supporters answered that they would be concerned.
A pro-EU opposition coalition “Serbia Against Violence” won 24% of the vote in December 2023 early elections. While the coalition has broken up in the meantime, all of its member parties took a negative position on lithium mining. So did the influential association of mostly liberal public figures “ProGlas”, which was formed ahead of the December elections as a “get out the vote” initiative.
This part of the public greeted the visit of German and EU officials with dismay and criticism. Vedran Džihić, Senior Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, points out that the visit came after an electoral cycle in Serbia “in which it became obvious that the electoral arena is neither free nor fair”. The conduct of the elections was criticised in December precisely by the German government, though without a visible follow-up.
On top of it, Džihić adds, recent events demonstrated a revival of Serbian nationalism on the regional scene, while in geopolitical terms Serbian President Vučić continued his policy of hedging in terms of foreign policy orientation, navigating strategically between Russia, China and the West.
“Against the background of all these developments, the decision to sign the strategic partnership and the strong role that Germany plays in it comes as a slap into the face for both the value-based EU integration process and for those citizens and groups fighting for democracy, freedom and European values in Serbia”, Džihić assesses.
He says that the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of pro-democratic forces will be further diminished, and even worse, the EU will not be seen as a democratic ally for the foreseeable future, which might be marked by increased repression against the opponents of mining.
Where is the enlargement in the equation?
A move that will most likely do no favours to the already low support for EU membership in Serbia seems to be at odds with the renewed push for EU enlargement, which appeared in the new EU Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. A trend of an increased focus on enlargement was kickstarted by the war in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, the EU is still treading cautiously in this area. There has been no direct political commitment regarding the date or the conditions for the acceptance of new members. Since the signing of the Memorandum last week, some commentators speculated whether this would mean an accelerated integration of Serbia into the EU. So far, there have been no indicators that this would be the case.
Vedran Džihić describes the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans as “a very pragmatic, transactional and in essence a value-emptied approach”, and sees the lithium as a continuation of it.
“In parallel, we can safely assume that as long as there is no willingness in Serbia to take the process of EU integration seriously, the EU’s leverage in terms of necessary transparency surrounding the lithium project, independence of institutions in charge and environmental standards will be very limited”, Džihić says.
Indeed, if there is a lack of enthusiasm in the EU for Serbia to become a member, the sentiment certainly goes both ways. In 2016, when he was still Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić pledged that Serbia would meet the conditions for EU membership by 2019. Five years later, this goal still seems far away and much lower on the list of the government’s priorities.
Upon the signing of the Memorandum on critical raw materials, Minister of Traffic and Infrastructure Goran Vesić assessed that Serbia “has essentially become an EU member”. It is an appropriate symbol for what seems to be the current level of ambition of the government – cooperate with the EU, but not necessarily become a full member, especially if it means the fulfilment of all of the demanding accession conditions.
If neither the EU nor the Serbian government are serious about the enlargement, the perception of the EU and the support for membership lose much of their relevance. This explains why the lithium deal might be regarded as a win-win situation. The only losers are the genuinely pro-European citizens of Serbia, who do not form a backbone of support for the ruling parties anyway.
